Human Factors Issues of Tcas: a Simulation-Based Study by Cabon, P. et al.
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology - 2005 
International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology 
2005 






See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005 
 Part of the Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Repository Citation 
Cabon, P., Rome, F., Favresse, A., Mollard, R., Figarol, S., Hasquenoph, B., & Houvenagel, C. (2005). Human 
Factors Issues of Tcas: a Simulation-Based Study. 2005 International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 
102-107. 
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005/13 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology at 
CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Symposium on Aviation Psychology - 2005 by an 
authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu. 
Authors 
P. Cabon, F. Rome, A. Favresse, R. Mollard, S. Figarol, B. Hasquenoph, and C. Houvenagel 
This article is available at CORE Scholar: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005/13 
HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES OF TCAS: A SIMULATION-BASED STUDY  
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Unité d’Ergonomie - LAA University Paris 5 - Paris, France 
 
Figarol, S. ; Hasquenoph, B. ; Houvenagel, C. 
DSNA1 - SDER- Sub Directorate for Studies and Research - Toulouse, France  
 
Since its introduction in the 90’s, TCAS II, presented as a straightforward and very reliable technological tool, has 
significantly reduced the risk of collision. Paradoxically, the introduction of this system has been accompanied with 
numerous incidents and one major accident in 2002, mainly due to unclear rules, poor air-ground cooperation and poor 
human decision. In order to investigate these potential human factors issues, a part-task air-ground simulation was 
conducted: 10 pilots and 10 controllers were involved in the simulations of 4 scenarios containing TCAS occurrences. 
Data collected included video camera recordings for behavioral analysis, Heart Rate (HR) for stress evaluation, 
questionnaires and debriefings for perceived risk levels and situational awareness assessment. The observations and 
errors were analyzed through the CREAM methodology. The debriefings were led through a self-confrontation 
technique, together with pilots and controllers. Results show that the simulations of TCAS situations were able to 
produce a significant physiological stress response with significant increase of HR when a resolution happens. 
Questionnaires and debriefings show that, in most of the observed cases, aircrew, and controllers are not sharing the 
same mental picture of the involved traffic and the risk of collision. This raises important issues in terms of 
cooperation between controllers and aircrews in such demanding occurrences. This should allow identifying risky 
situations and the related generic causes. The results will be discussed, aiming at a potential improvement of the 
system, in terms of Human Machine Interface, training and consistency of procedures. 
 
                         
1 Previous name was CENA (Centre d’Etudes de la Navigation Aérienne), which is part of DSNA. 
Introduction 
 
The prevention of mid-air collision has been a major 
safety issue in aviation for years. Since its introduction in 
the 90’s, the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 
System II (TCAS II), presented as a straightforward and 
very reliable technological tool, has significantly reduced 
the risk of collision. The latest version, TCAS II Version 
7 was built upon lessons learned from TCAS II use and 
problems (Wickens, 1992) TCAS II is now a mandatory 
device for all commercial aircraft with more than 19 
passengers seats. This system issues two types of alerts : 
the Traffic Advisory (TA) which identifies a traffic as an 
intruder whose position should be closely monitored (but 
no actions are required for the aircrew) and the 
Resolution Advisory (RA) that recommends a vertical 
escape maneuver to maintain a self separation. 
Paradoxically, the introduction of this system has and 
still contributes to severe incidents and was the main 
cause of one major accident, the mid-air collision 
between a B757 and a Tupolev at Uberlingen Lake in 
2002. The major cause of this accident lies in the 
decision of the Tupolev captain to follow, (accordingly to 
his company’s manual), the Air Traffic Controllers 
(ATC) instruction to immediately initiate a descent 
though it was contrary to the RA order (BFU, 2004). 
Even if an improvement seems to show up over the last 
years mainly due to aircrew and Air Traffic Controllers 
(ATCO) drastic changes in information and training 
(Powell and Baldwin, 2002) it is still observed cases 
where aircrews failed to follow the RA or over-reacted or 
simply disregarded the alert. Obviously, this system still 
raises many human factors issues that directly impair air 
safety. A preliminary study (Cabon et al, 2003) 
conducted by means of collective and individual 
interviews of controllers and pilots emphasized the 
following issues: stress, man-machine interface, training, 
airline procedures and aircrew-ATC communications. 
The present study aims to investigate the potential human 
factors issues in an air-ground simulation. The use of 
simulation is essential as the previous studies emphasised 
the need to reproduce in real time the temporal pressure 
and the stress that experience both pilots and ATCOs 






All the simulation settings were designed by the Centre 
d’Etudes de la Navigation Aérienne (CENA) in 
Toulouse (France).The three main elements were: 
 
• An Airbus A320 part-task simulator including for 
both the Pilot Flying (PF) and the Pilot Non Flying 
(PNF), the main displays and tools that are needed to 
present and respond to a TCAS resolution: the 
Navigation Display (ND), the Primary Flight Display 
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(PFD), the Flight Control Unit (FCU) and a side stick. 
Radio communications with ATC are available.  
• An ATC position with the 2 radar displays and 
paper strips for the planning and executive controllers. 
• A “pseudo-pilots” position where 2 experts play 
the role of the surrounding traffic. The ATC did not 
know during the simulation what aircraft was actually 
“piloted” or “pseudo-piloted”. 
 
The main and most valuable feature was the integration 
of the actual TCAS software and HMI in the cockpit 




While high technical fidelity was out of scope, 
operational aspects were taken as important. For this 
study, 4 scenarios have been especially designed. The 
first one (Biarritz) was designed by the CENA to induce 
a high probability to trigger a TCAS alert. In this 
scenario, always presented first, neither the ATCOs nor 
the aircrews knew that the study was dealing with 
TCAS operation. The three other scenarios (named 
respectively Marseille, Orly and Reims) were based on 
real incidents that were selected in collaboration with 
the CENA and the Service du Contrôle du Trafic Aérien 
(SCTA). In these scenarios, the ATCO were asked to 
“play a part”, reproducing certain errors in order to 
induce a conflict likely to trigger a TCAS alert. Each 




A total of 10 A320/330/340 pilots (i.e. 5 aircrews) and 
10 ATCOs (ACC and APP) were involved in this study.  
 
At the beginning of each session, none of the 
participant knew the precise scope of this study, in 




Four kinds of data were collected: 
• Direct observations and video of both working 
positions to trace displays, events, actions and 
communications to subsequently analyze behavior. 
Specific observation grids were developed using the 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM) (Hollnagel, 1998). On top of this, one of the 
observer was a fully qualified pilot able to pinpoint fine 
details not caught by the video. Two Human Factors 
experts also observed aircrew and ATCO. 
• Subjective assessment. After each scenario, 
participants were asked to fill out questionnaires to rate 
their situational awareness, their stress and various 
aspects that were relevant to understand how they had 
perceived the scenario and the TCAS sequence. 
• Heart rate (HR). In order to get an objective 
measurement of stress, heart rate was continuously 
recorded during the scenario by means of a digitized 
recorder (Vitaport, Temec ®).  
• Collective debriefing. The aim of the debriefing 
was to collect the verbalization of both pilots and 
ATCOs on what happened during the scenarios. The 
debriefing was supported by an auto-confrontation 
using the video and communication recordings. This 
debriefing was very useful to assess the situational 
awareness of participants. It also allowed revealing 
their a posteriori understanding of the situation, in 
relation to the ASR or reports they would have to fill 
in. At the end, a discussion was set up about the main 
safety-related issues and suggestions to reduce risk in 
operational environment.  
 
Each session lasted one day from 0900 to 1730. The 
four scenarios were played in the morning while the 







During the study, 20 scenarios have been played (i.e. 4 
scenarios X 5 days). Both the simulation setting and the 
scenarios were efficient to induce a significant number 
of TCAS events allowing the data analysis. The 
following TCAS events occurred during the 
simulations: 
• 8 TA not followed by a RA, 
• 18 sequences TA/RA (some with several RA), 
• 37 RA (initial and sense reversal or weakening RA).  
 
A rather good variability of RA was obtained, with a 
majority of Adjust Vertical Speed which are known to 
be often misinterpreted by aircrews.  
 
Heart Rate (HR) 
Stress was objectively measured in this study using a 
continuous recording of HR. As there is a considerable 
inter-individual variability in HR, all the data are 
expressed as the percentage of variation of the 1st 
percentile of the total recording (reference). Figure 1 
shows an example of HR recording for a pilot and an 
ATCO during a TCAS sequence. 
 
This example shows a clear physiological reaction to 
the occurrence of the different TCAS events for the 
pilot and the ATCO. For the pilot HR increased 
dramatically after the TA up to 80% when the two first 
RA “Climb” and “Adjust Vertical Speed” are issued.  
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Figure 1. HR expressed as a percentage of the 
reference (1st percentile of the total recording) during a 
TCAS sequence for one pilot (PNF) and one ATC 
 
Then, HR progressively decreased even with the two 
subsequent RA suggesting an adaptation of the 
physiological stress to the situation. The level returns to 
the initial level (around 30%) after the “Clear of Conflict” 
announce. For the ATCO, HR increased progressively 
after the STCA and reached a maximum (>60%) after the 
TCAS and airprox reporting by the aircrew. In most of the 
simulations, a similar pattern was observed with some 
variability in the magnitude of variations. This result 
confirms that, even in a part task simulator, the scenarios 
and the environment are able to induce a significant stress 
effect. In some cases, stress induced changes in behaviour. 
In one simulation, after the aircrew had solved a multiple 
RA sequence, a second TA appeared while the crew was 
resuming normal navigation. This TA was not detected by 
the aircrew, and even during the auto-confrontation they 
had difficulties to recognize this event. This suggests a 
“post-stress” or a “slacking” effect that reduced the 
available resources of the crew. A systematic analysis is 
being carried out on the relationship between physiological 
manifestations of stress and some behavioural changes that 
occurred during the simulations. 
 
Thematic Analysis 
From the data collected, two topics have been selected 
as relevant from a Human Factors and operational point 
of view: 
• situational awareness, 
• aircrew-ATCO cooperation and communications. 
 
Situational Awareness (SA) 
SA has been analysed regarding four main issues:  
• data collection,  
• timing of the TCAS sequence,  
• control over the situation,  
• common perception of conflicts by aircrew and ATC 
 
Data collection. Since its introduction, TCAS has 
introduced a major change in the perception of traffic 
situation by aircrew. In fact, surrounding traffics are 
continuously displayed on the ND (CDTI). Therefore, 
aircrews now try to build an overall picture of the 
traffic situation based on this information while in the 
past this was only done through the hearing of the ATC 
communications (party line). This may impact the R/T 
communications, even before the TCAS issues an alert. 
The following examples of aircrew messages to the 
ATC during the simulations were recorded before and 
during TA’s (most are translated from French): 
• Before a TA : “we’ve got a traffic”, “we’ve got an 
aircraft”, “traffic TCAS”, “you’ve got a traffic 
information ?”.  
• During a TA : “we’ve got a TCAS”, “TCAS alert”, 
“we’ve got a visual”, “we’ve got a visual TCAS” “we 
have it on TCAS” 
 
These messages were intended to ask for traffic 
information or were an answer to an ATC clearance or 
a traffic information given by the ATC. They are not 
covered by any procedure or rule and may interfere 
with the ATC work and induce misunderstanding. For 
example, the word “visual” may be understood by the 
ATC as “I have a visual contact on the traffic” or 
“Traffic TCAS” can be understood as “we’ve got a 
RA”. The display of traffic on the ND may also lead to 
false interpretation. For example in the Orly scenario all 
pilots have seen the traffic as the aircraft ahead on the 
approach, which was not the case. This 
misinterpretation has a direct impact on aircrew SA and 
may lead to incorrect maneuver in case of RA (as it 
happened in the real situation). 
 
The timing of the TCAS sequences. The analysis of 
TCAS sequences reveals a large variability in the timing 
of the TCAS events. In this study, the duration of TA 
varies from 2 sec to 38 sec. In one case, a RA occurred 
without being preceded by a TA. The collective 
debriefing showed that most participants are not aware of 
this large variability. The absence of TA leads to a 
situation where the aircrews could not be properly 
prepared to respond to the RA. In this case, the procedure 
which is normally followed after a TA in most airlines 
(the captain announcing “I (or you) have the control”, 
switching off the Flight Director) cannot be applied. The 
high unpredictability of the TCAS sequence impacts SA 
as prevision and anticipation play a major role in the 
building process of SA (Endsley, 1998). 
 
The control over the situation by the aircrew. After 
each scenario, the participants were asked to rate how 
difficult it was to evaluate the situation and whether 
they felt they started to loose the control over the 





























   No Yes 
PF 11 9 Did you find difficult to 
assess the situation ? PNF 16 4 
PF 20 0 Did you felt that you were 
losing control of the 
situation ? 
PNF 20 0 
 
Table 1. Evaluation and control of the situation by the 
aircrew 
 
Results show that the feeling of a global situation 
assessment is higher among the PNF than for the PF. 
This can be explained by the fact that PF are mostly 
focussed on the active following of the RA and are not 
seeking to have an understanding of the situation. The 
following statements of PF’s during the debriefings 
confirm this attitude: “You cannot react according to 
what you understand”,” I don’t know what happened” 
“I do not remember to descend”, “I focused on the IVSI 
[NB : where the RA is displayed on Airbus aircraft], I 
do not look at the ND”. During the debriefing, most of 
pilots stated that the RA TCAS are too unpredictable 
and that it is preferable to concentrate on the execution 
of the manoeuvre. In this context, they do not expect or 
seek traffic information from the ATC. 
 
Common perception of conflicts by aircrew and 
ATC. One of the most striking results from the 
collective debriefing was the large shift in the 
perceptions of ATCOs and aircrews on the same 
situations. The auto-confrontation of the participants 
with the video recordings showed that most ATCOs are 
not aware of how the TCAS is displayed in the cockpit. 
Aircrews are also not informed about the ATC tools, 
especially regarding the functioning of the STCA and 
the characteristics of radar display (precision and 
refreshment rate). This was confirmed by the results of 
2 questions asked to the aircrews and ATCOs (Table 2). 
These questions have been asked only for the Biarritz 
scenarios where ATCOs were not aware of the aim of 
study and did not expect the situation at all.  
 
The most striking results are the large number of 
negative answers (11 out 20) and the uncertainty of the 
PNF (4 answers “don’t know” out of 5). This shift is 
mainly due to the different and independent tools that 
are used by ATCOs and aircrews, e.g. time shift 
between STCA and TCAS. This leads to a lack of 
common perception of the situation which may interfere 
in the communication and cooperation between ATCOs 
and aircrews in these demanding situations. 
 
 
No Yes Don’t 
know 
PF 1 0 4 To the aircrew: Do you 
think you had a 
common perception 
with ATCO? 
PNF 5 0 0 
ATC1 3 1 0 To the ATCO: Do you 
think you had a 
common perception 
with aircrew? 
ATC2 2 0 3 
 
Table 2. Feeling of a common representation by ATC 
an aircrew 
 
The Aircrew-ATCO Communications 
 
In this section, the main results regarding the 
communications between ATCOs and aircrews are 
reported. The results are presented both for the messages 
from aircrew to ATCO and from ATCO to aircrew. 
Aircrew notification The only way for the ATCO to be 
informed of a TCAS resolution is through the 
notification of the RA by the PNF.  The airline 
procedure provides only 2 messages, whatever the RA 
issued: “TCAS climb” or “TCAS descend”. In this 
study, for simple RA such as Climb or Descend, the 
observed messages are consistent with the procedure 
which is, in this case, clear and appropriate. For the 
other RA a large variability of phraseology is used, with 
sometimes some ambiguous. For example, some pilots 
used the message “TCAS descend” to report an Adjust 
Vertical Speed RA, although this RA always means a 
decrease of vertical speed that may occur while the 
aircraft is climbing. This raises the issue of the alert 
“Adjust vertical speed” which does not give directly the 
sense of the RA and, as a consequence, the way the 
pilot can report it to the ATC. 
 
ATCO instructions Since the accident of Uberlingen 
(BFU, 2004) both aircrews and ATCOs are aware that 
aircrews must follow their RA and that ATC should not 
give any clearance to the aircrew. However, on the 5 
scenarios that have been played where the ATCOs were 
involved, 2 ATC clearances have been given to aircrew 
who followed these clearances. In these two cases, the 
ATC clearance was given because the ATCO was 
trying to avoid a conflict with another aircraft. In one 
case, the clearance happened while the ATCO thought 
that the conflict is solved, for the other, the clearance 
was compatible with the RA TCAS.  The critical aspect 
is that the initial RA could be followed by another RA 
which may be incompatible with the clearance. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The results obtained in this study show that even a 
partial simulation of tasks was able to reproduce TCAS 
events, stress and behaviors that raise several human 
factors issues that could not be revealed in incident 
reporting. The simulation conditions enabled producing 
the temporal pressure and stress that is inherent in the 
TCAS sequences. The assessment method that was 
developed for this study, gathering physiological 
recordings, observations, verbalization and 
questionnaires showed its strength to detect and analyze 
the critical human factors issues to be addressed in the 
future. These issues have to be considered in the 
aircrew-ATCO relation and not only at one level. To 
summarize these issues, the TCAS sequences can be 
represented as a “parenthesis” in the normal aircrew-
ATC communication and cooperation (figure 2). This 
figure depicts the several events and sequences that 
follow one another. The upper part represents the TCAS 
events occurring in the cockpit, the lower part the ATC 
side and in-between the air-ground communications. As 
it is shown, the effects of TCAS occur before the TA, 
when a traffic is displayed on the ND. This leads to a 
change in the communication with potential 
interferences and disruptive effects as it was reported 
earlier (Benhacène, 2001 ; Walsh, 1997). The 
subsequent sequence starts when a TA occurs. This 
period is critical for the aircrew as it is intended to 
prepare them for a potential RA. One of the main issue 
related to this period that was revealed by the study is 
the very large variability of the timing of the sequence: 
from very short (even in one case, with no TA) - which 
does not allow the crew to apply the expected procedure 
and be mentally prepared to react- to long periods 
where the preparation can diminish progressively. As 
airborne and ATC systems are independent, additional 
interferences can occur at this moment due to the STCA 
triggering which may induce actions from the ATCO. 
When the RA occurs, a critical period is starting (T1). 
As long as the aircrew has not reported the RA, the 
ATC has no means to be informed that the TCAS has 
issued an alert.  
 
This creates a very sensitive situation where ATC may 
still give clearances that can be very disruptive for the 
aircrew. The reporting of the RA by the aircrew is 
expected to open the parenthesis in the aircrew-ATCO 
communications. However, as demonstrated by our 
results the reporting is sometimes inexistent, late or 
ambiguous. The “Clear of Conflict” (CoC) message 
from the TCAS starts another critical period (T2). As 
for T1, as long as it is not reported by the aircrew, the 
ATCO is ignorant of the end of the RA. This raises a 
transfer of liability issue between the aircrew and the 
ATCO: who is responsible for the separation of   
Figure 2. The parenthesis in the aircrew-ATCO 
communications in the TCAS sequence 
 
aircraft? The report of the CoC by the aircrew to the 
ATC closes the parenthesis, the aircrew normally 
returning to the initial clearance, and resuming normal 
navigation (auto-pilot ON, flight director ON). As it 
was shown in the results, these tasks and a potential 
slack in attention due to the stress experience during the 
RA may have potential impact in this period reducing 
the attention on subsequent TA.   
 
Most of participants (pilots and ATCOs) stated that this 
type of simulation and common debriefing allowed 
them to better realize the operational issues and 
difficulties in these time-critical situations: some had a 
clear understanding of TCAS and associated procedures 
but no operational experience. They were surprised to 
have performed away from their understanding under 
time pressure and they noticed the consequences of 
their action on the other’s job (ATCO or aircrew). So 
this represents a step forward as far as training is 
concerned into practice for the training process. Further 
analyses of the data are currently conducted in order to 
get a systematic analysis of errors. 
 
A second round of simulations was conducted in 
autumn 2004: some changes were applied to scenarios 
in order to keep the ATCOs in their operational role. 
This led to some new situations and opened some new 
issues about these very short intensive periods. From 
the whole results and discussions of both sessions, 
some solutions will be suggested, which may reinforce 
or question present studies related to TCAS 
improvement. One of the most encouraging outputs is 
the method that was used to tackle the human aspects of 
the air-ground integration and could be use for the 
evaluation of solutions such as the RA downlink 
(Broker, 2004): it is a valuable complement to other 
approaches that have already been conducted: incident 
analysis, simulations involving only one side (RADE1, 
2004), or field evaluations (Walsh, 1997). It may also 
be a valuable complement to present training methods, 








RA TCAS Clear of Conflict
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